An Investigation of Firm Heterogeneity in the Constraints to
      Development and Growth in Pakistan by Moghal, Sajjad & Pfau, Wade D.
© The Pakistan Development Review 
48 : 1 (Spring 2009) pp. 1–22 
 
 
 
An Investigation of Firm Heterogeneity in  
the Constraints to Development and  
Growth in Pakistan 
 
SAJJAD MOGHAL and WADE D. PFAU* 
 
This study considers the importance of firm characteristics in explaining the degree of 
business constraints facing Pakistani firms in the Investment Climate Survey.  We quantify 
how firms with differing characteristics experience particular problems.  After controlling for 
other factors, the largest differences in responses to business constraints occur among firms 
that vary by manufacturing industry, and among firms operating under different ownership 
structures or selling in different markets.  In some cases, firm size and firm location also play 
an important role.  The age of the firm generally does not lead to significant differences.  These 
results account for the heterogeneity of firms better than others, and may be important for 
policy-makers to develop more specific approaches to fostering the investment climate. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
What is the key to a country’s economic development?  This question has 
produced great controversy and a wide variety of answers.  In recent years, the answers 
have increasingly emphasised the microeconomic institutions of a country: is there a 
strong legal system to promote property rights, is corruption under control, can financial 
institutions play their role as intermediaries between savers and investors, and so forth?  
In this new analytical framework, macroeconomic stability is not sufficient for 
development.  It is along these lines that the most multilateral development institutions 
now place an increasing focus on improving the business or investment climate.  A 
country cannot be expected to grow and flourish if potential entrepreneurs see no 
incentive to taking risks and expanding their businesses.  Risk taking must provide the 
potential for rewards, but rewards can be almost nonexistent without the appropriate 
microeconomic institutions. 
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In order to analyse the investment climate, the World Bank commissioned surveys 
for 53 countries.  In the case of Pakistan, an Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) 
survey was administered in 2002 in conjunction with the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development Authority (SMEDA), Pakistan.  This survey of 956 firms is the most 
extensive for Pakistan and will be the subject of our analysis.  It is not the only survey of 
Pakistani businesses though, as more limited surveys were used to understand business 
constraints in World Bank (2001a), SMEDA (2002), and Bari, et al. (2002), among 
others. 
Of course, the businesses of Pakistan are not homogenous units.  They vary along 
a number of important dimensions, including their size, location, exporter status, type of 
production, age, and type of ownership.  However, while previous studies have made 
attempts to understand business constraints in Pakistan, they have not included a 
systematic effort to understand the heterogeneity of Pakistani firms relating to these 
various constraints.  Many discussions of policy reform tend to imply a one-policy-fits-all 
approach.  Some of these studies make initial attempts along these lines by tabulating 
their results based on firm size or geographical region.  But this is not sufficient to 
understand the differences in constraints and we are often left to wonder what 
characteristic of the firm (its size or its location) is driving the difference in firm 
responses.   
Our goal in this paper is to provide a more systematic analysis of how the 
characteristics of a firm affect its responses to questions about various business 
constraints, in order to contribute to the discussion of reform efficacy in Pakistan.  We 
accomplish this by using an ordered probit analysis.  The reported degree of constraint 
facing a business is the dependent variable to be explained by a number of underlying 
firm characteristics, including firm size, province, exporter status, type of firm 
production, firm age, and the type of firm ownership.  This regression analysis makes it 
possible to know whether firm size, for example, leads to significantly different responses 
about firm constraints after controlling for the other firm characteristics.  By knowing 
this, we can gain more insight when interpreting the cross-tabulations of business 
constraints by different firm characteristics.  This will allow for a more detailed analysis 
of Pakistan’s business or investment climate, and perhaps even uncover further areas for 
reforms in the Pakistan economy. 
As shared above, for the purpose of this paper, the Investment Climate Survey 
2002 dataset has been analysed and our analysis proceeds as follows.1  In Section 2, we 
provide background about previous studies of the Pakistan business climate, as well as 
motivate how the trend toward microeconomic institutional focus developed.  Section 3 
follows with a description of the Pakistan ICA and summary statistics for the sample 
firms.  Section 4 explains the methodology of the ordered probit model approach.  
Section 5 provides the results, and Section 6 follows with conclusions and policy 
recommendations.  Briefly, our findings suggest that a firm’s characteristics plays an 
important role in determining its responses to different business constraints in Pakistan.  
 
1In 2006, the World Bank and SMEDA began work on the Investment Climate Assessment II for 
Pakistan.  This survey was expected to be released in 2008, but it has not yet been cleared for use by private 
researchers.  Subsequent research will consider this survey as well.  It will be interesting to study the ICA II, 
because questions about business constraints are asked several times to check for consistency in the answers, 
and firms are also asked to rank the biggest three constraints and the three most needed reforms. 
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Firms that differ by export status, by the type of sub-manufacturing industry, and by firm 
ownership status, provide significantly different responses about the degree of business 
constraints.  Exporters enjoy better conditions, as do firms in the sports goods, leather 
goods, and electronics industries.  Meanwhile, private limited companies face additional 
burdens than other types of firm ownership structures.  In some cases, firm size and firm 
location also play an important role.  Medium size firms generally face more difficult 
conditions, as do firms in Sindh or Punjab.  Finally, firm age does not generally play 
much role in determining firm responses.   
 
2.  BACKGROUND 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) designed the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) to assist 
economic development by providing credit for debt-ridden countries. Under World Bank 
and IMF conditionality, the SAP dominated economic policy planning in many 
developing countries. A typical SAP facility required the recipient country to restructure 
its economy in order to reduce deficits and yield financial resources required to pay 
debts. The prescribed macroeconomic framework included “structural” reforms to 
deregulate the economy, liberalise trade and investment, and privatise state enterprises. 
These were coupled with short-term stabilisation measures, including cutbacks in 
government expenditures, increased interest rates, and currency devaluation. The 
widespread failure of SAP in most of the low and middle income countries to yield 
sustainable moderate growth, as discussed in World Bank (2001b), prompted a paradigm 
shift even within the World Bank toward a broader economic development approach. 
Policy-makers realised that alongside deregulation, trade liberalisation, and fiscal 
discipline, microeconomic incentives are equally important to firm development and to 
stimulate private sector growth. 
As such, the World Bank has increasingly focused on microeconomic incentives in 
recent years.  James Wolfensohn, then president of the World Bank, developed the New 
Development Framework in 1999.  His approach de-emphasised macroeconomic issues 
and moved the focus to fighting corruption, to creating an effective justice system, and to 
promoting a supervised financial system.  There is only so much that macroeconomic 
stability can provide if a country’s institutions are not designed to effectively facilitate 
investment and growth.   
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2005 describes the World Bank’s 
efforts to understand the investment climate in low and middle income countries.  The 
report analyses survey data from 26,000 firms in 53 developing countries, in order to 
examine the relationship between the investment climate and growth.  These surveys are 
conducted with local partners in each country, in order to include local input for policy 
reforms.  The purpose of these investment climate surveys is to identify areas for policy 
reform that can reduce the burden on business and encourage them to invest and expand, 
with the idea that such growth will lessen poverty for everyone.  The World Bank seeks 
to define how certain economic policy measures have the ability to unleash the growth 
potential of a country or otherwise restrain it from growing.  
The World Bank, in collaboration with the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development Authority (SMEDA) of Pakistan, produced an investment climate 
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assessment for Pakistan in 2003.  The World Bank (2003) concluded that Pakistan needs 
to focus on microeconomic reforms to reduce business costs by providing better services 
in the areas of “power, telecom, tax administration, access to finance, and law and order” 
(p. iv).  The World Bank’s assessment focused on comparing various summary statistics 
from the survey to the situation in other comparable countries, mainly China, 
Bangladesh, and India.  More detailed work was recently published as Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005).  Table 1 compares the percentage of firms ranking a 
constraint as major or severe for these four countries.  Generally, Bangladesh faces a 
more severe situation than Pakistan, but Pakistan’s firms have more complaints than 
those in China or India.  While such analysis is important, as a comparison to 
international benchmarks is needed to be able to quantify the severity of problems in 
Pakistan, there are still plenty of insights beyond the scope of the World Bank’s 
assessment remaining to be learned from the survey results. 
 
Table 1 
Investment Climate Indicators in Four Countries  
(Percentage of Firms Ranking Constraint as Major or Very Severe) 
Constraint Pakistan Bangladesh China India 
Tax Administration 47.0% 50.7% 26.7% 26.4% 
Tax Rates 46.8% 35.8% 36.8% 27.9% 
Financing 40.8% 45.7% 22.3% 19.2% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty 40.4% 45.4% 32.9% 20.9% 
Corruption 40.3% 57.9% 27.3% 37.4% 
Electricity 39.3% 73.2% 29.7% 28.9% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder 21.4% 39.4% 20.0% 15.6% 
Labour Regulations 15.8% 10.8% 20.7% 16.7% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers 13.0% 19.8% 30.7% 12.5% 
Source: For Pakistan, own calculations from Pakistan ICA.  For others, World Bank (2004b). 
 
While the World Bank’s assessment is able to use the most comprehensive survey 
available for Pakistani businesses, there have also been other analyses of the business 
situation. Of these, Bari, et al. (2002) is the most thorough, though they rely on a more 
limited survey of 54 firms to base their conclusions.  These authors develop the notion of 
a “binding constraint” as a way to target the problems most affecting firm growth and 
investment, noting the need to focus on microeconomic as well as macroeconomic 
problems.  They also do their best to obtain a good representation of firm sizes in several 
manufacturing and retail sectors.  The binding constraints they observe include issues 
related to financing, infrastructure, government regulation, human resources, market 
regulations, and macroeconomic uncertainty.   
In a separate study, World Bank (2001a) uses a larger survey of 500 firms to 
identify the severity of constraints based on firm perceptions.  Their two-tiered approach 
first identifies the top ten problems experienced by firms in their efforts to grow, and then 
further investigates seven of these constraints.  The analysis is limited to the presentation 
of summary statistics based on enterprise perception. Nevertheless, the unique feature 
was the larger representation of smaller size firms in the survey from the all major 
economic sectors, including industry, trade, and services. 
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Finally, a key early paper that helped begin the debate on SME policy in 
Pakistan is SMEDA (2002).  They survey 333 firms in order to develop a set of 
policies for micro, small and medium enterprises.  They give special attention to the 
necessary legislation and administrative steps for compliance. The distinctive 
contribution of this study is to identify important issues related to labour welfare and 
taxation laws. The study further helps to clarify the complications faced by smaller 
firms in their attempts to comply with these laws.  The study maintains an overall 
focus on three broad issues, which included labour laws, business credit or enterprise 
financing, and taxation. 
 
3.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
We will provide a more detailed analysis of business constraints in Pakistan, using 
the Investment Climate Survey of Pakistan 2002.  The data consists of 956 firms 
interviewed in Pakistan by the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority of 
the Government of Pakistan in collaboration with the World Bank between May and 
November 2002.  The firms were sampled randomly from a sample frame drawn from the 
directories of registered businesses published by each of the four provincial government 
labour departments. The published directories were updated in 2000 and disaggregated in 
terms of employment and industrial sub-sectors. This allows the survey sample to be 
fairly representative of industrial activity in Pakistan’s twelve largest cities for seven 
manufacturing industries chosen in terms of their contribution to GDP.  The ICA is the 
largest dataset available, and care was taken to make it representative of Pakistan’s 
business enterprise population as described in Pakistan’s Economic Census of 2001.  
Because of its size and scope, the dataset is rich enough to allow an extensive look at the 
heterogeneity of firms, and how this heterogeneity contributes to firm responses about 
business constraints. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the firm characteristics in the survey 
sample.  Firm size includes four categories based on the number of workers employed at 
the firm.2  Micro firms employ 1 to 9 workers, while small firms employ 10 to 49 
workers, medium firms employ 50 to 99 workers, and large firms have 100 or more 
workers.  Micro firms account for 13.2 percent of the sample.  Meanwhile, small firms 
represent 58.6 percent of the total, medium firms another 14.7 percent, and large firms 
account for 13.5 percent.  With regard to Pakistan’s four provinces, Punjab accounts for 
60.7 percent of the firms in the survey, while 25 percent are in Sindh, 7.9 percent in 
NWFP, and 6.4 percent in Balochistan.3  Meanwhile, 18.7 percent of the firms in the 
survey export at least some of their product.   
 
2These firm size definitions are based on the continuing discussions for the proposed SME Policy of 
Pakistan.  For details, please see SME Issues Paper and SME policy task force reports as available on the 
website www.smepolicy.net.pk 
3The results of the Economic Census of 2005 also suggest similar geographic patterns of industrial 
establishments, though we find that Sindh and Balochistan are overrepresented.  Punjab is home to six of the 
most industrialised cities and 68.4 percent of Pakistan’s 583,000 industrial establishments. Sindh, the home of 
Pakistan’s largest industrial city Karachi, includes 13.9 percent of industrial establishments, while there are 16 
percent in NWFP, and 1.4 percent in Balochistan. 
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Table 2 
Description of Survey Data 
 Number of Firms Percent of Firms 
Firm Size     
 Micro 126 13.2% 
 Small 560 58.6% 
 Medium 141 14.7% 
 Large 129 13.5% 
Province     
 Sindh 239 25.0% 
 NWFP 76 7.9% 
 Punjab 580 60.7% 
 Balochistan 61 6.4% 
Exporter Status     
 No Exports 777 81.3% 
 Exports 179 18.7% 
Type of Production     
 Textiles 342 35.8% 
 Garments 136 14.2% 
 Leather and Leather Products 40 4.2% 
 Food Processing 151 15.8% 
 Electronics and Electrical Equipment 101 10.6% 
 Chemicals 138 14.4% 
 Sports Goods 46 4.8% 
 Other 2 0.2% 
Firm Age     
 0-5 Years 96 10.0% 
 6–10 Years 285 29.8% 
 11–15 Years 228 23.8% 
 16 + Years 347 36.3% 
Firm Ownership     
 Publicly Listed Company 32 3.3% 
 Private Held, Limited Company 486 50.8% 
 Partnership 167 17.5% 
 Sole Proprietorship 255 26.7% 
 Other 16 1.7% 
Source: Own calculations from Pakistan Investment Climate Assessment. 
 
Furthermore, the firms surveyed are involved in a variety of manufacturing 
industries. These industries include textiles (35.8 percent), food processing (15.8 
percent), chemicals (14.4 percent), garments (14.2 percent), electronics and electrical 
equipment (10.6 percent), sporting goods (4.8 percent), leather and leather products (4.2 
percent), and two other firms that were not classified.  With regard to firm age, 10 
percent of firms are between 0 and 5 years old, while 29.8 percent of firms are 6 to 10 
years old, 23.8 percent of firms are 11 to 15 years old, and 36.3 percent of firms are at 
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least 16 years old.  Finally, the formal ownership structure of the firm is also important.  
In this regard, the more formal firms, publicly listed or privately held limited companies, 
together make up 54.1 percent of the surveyed firms.  Sole proprietorships and 
partnerships provide 44.2 percent of the sample, and other categories represent another 
1.7 percent. 
 
4.  METHODOLOGY 
Our goal is to understand the constraints facing Pakistani business. The business 
constraints in Pakistan will be considered along several different lines.  Important among 
these are the size of the firm, the location of the firm, whether the firm is an exporter, the 
type of goods produced by the firm, the age of the firm, and the type of firm ownership.  
We attempt to understand these constraints through a system of self-reporting in the 
Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) of Pakistan.  The ICA asked firms to rank 
seventeen different business obstacles on a scale with five categories ranging from “No 
Obstacle” to “Very Severe Obstacle.”  Table 3 shows how the 956 firms responded to 
each constraint.  The list of constraints is provided in descending order for the sum of the 
“major obstacle” and “very severe obstacle” categories.  We consider the results of the 
survey questions asking how severely constraining are various possible impediments to 
Pakistani business. This discussion will allow for a characterisation of the problems most 
affecting business in Pakistan. 
 
Table 3 
Firm Responses to Business Obstacles 
Constraints None Minor Moderate Major Very Severe 
Tax Administration 24.40% 11.20% 17.40% 17.30% 29.70% 
Tax Rates 25.40% 9.40% 18.40% 15.30% 31.50% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates) 26.30% 13.10% 17.40% 13.60% 29.60% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty 29.50% 11.20% 18.90% 14.20% 26.20% 
Corruption 28.60% 12.00% 19.10% 15.10% 25.20% 
Electricity 21.30% 20.10% 19.30% 16.60% 22.70% 
Access to Financing (Collateral) 29.60% 12.50% 19.60% 15.90% 22.40% 
Macro-economic Instability 30.40% 13.60% 21.60% 14.60% 19.90% 
Customs and Trade Regul. 43.80% 14.10% 17.70% 12.70% 11.70% 
Anti-competitive Practices 37.20% 19.60% 21.80% 8.70% 12.80% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder 44.80% 17.40% 16.40% 10.20% 11.20% 
Access to Land 46.40% 16.80% 15.70% 10.10% 11.10% 
Labour Regulations 43.80% 17.40% 23.00% 10.20% 5.70% 
Business Permits 52.60% 17.30% 15.40% 8.00% 6.70% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers 48.30% 19.90% 18.90% 7.60% 5.30% 
Transportation 46.40% 23.60% 19.90% 6.50% 3.70% 
Telecommunications 53.90% 25.60% 12.90% 4.20% 3.50% 
Source: Own calculations from Pakistan Investment Climate Assessment. 
Note: Constraints in the shaded part of the Table are “binding,” as defined in Section 4. 
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We employ the concept of “binding constraint” to identify those constraints which 
produce the largest complaints from firms.  Following the approach of Bari, et al. (2002), we 
use two criteria for determining a binding constraint: the median firm response must identify 
the constraint as at least a “moderate obstacle,” and at least 30 percent of firms must identify 
the constraint as a “major obstacle” or a “very severe obstacle”.  Both criteria identify the first 
eight constraints listed in Table 3 as binding, from “Tax Administration” to “Macroeconomic 
Instability”.  At the cut-off point there is a large drop, as while 34.4 percent of firms identify 
macroeconomic instability as a severe or major constraint, only 24.3 percent of firms provide 
the same answer for customs and trade regulations. Binding constraints are of more interest, 
because these constraints suggest the areas where reform could produce the most benefit.  It 
may be less effective to devote policy resources to areas where firms do not complain as 
loudly. We see that tax issues, financing issues, policy uncertainty, corruption, electricity, and 
macroeconomic instability produce the largest concerns for firms. Customs and trade 
regulations, anti-competitive practices, crime, land, labour and business regulations, the skills 
of the labour force, transportation, and telecommunications are not constraining firms to as 
large of degree.  In comparison, SMEDA (2006) identifies the business environment, access 
to finance, human resource development, and support for technology as four of the most 
important areas for SME policy. 
To understand the nature of the binding constraints, as well as the other 
constraints, we wish to determine what characteristics of a firm lead it to respond in a 
particular way. For example, it will be enlightening to know if small firms complain 
much more strongly than large firms about the access to financing.  The overwhelming 
benefit of our approach is that we can control for other firm characteristics to make these 
conclusions.  We will know that it is because firms are small that they answer in some 
particular way, and not because, for example, small firms tend to manufacture particular 
goods or be located in particular regions, and it is these other factors that are driving the 
firm’s response.  Such knowledge can guide policy-makers to design more appropriate 
policies responding to the specific needs of Pakistani firms. 
An ordered probit model provides a natural approach for determining the 
significance of particular firm characteristics in answering about the degree of a 
constraint. Our dependent variable, the measure of constraint severity, includes five 
ordered categories.  Ordinary least squares is not appropriate because there is no reason 
to believe that the differences between categories will be equal. We cannot observe the 
true severity of a constraint, which we call variable y*.  Each of the ranking categories 
refers to a range of actual severity.  As the constraint grows for a firm, the constraint will 
reach a threshold and move to the next higher category.  An ordered probit model 
provides a way to model this phenomenon.  We seek to estimate: 
y* ,ε+β+α= X and we observe y, where y = 










≤δ
δ≤≤δ
δ≤≤δ
δ≤≤δ
δ≤
*
4
4
*
3
3
*
2
2
*
1
1
*
if,4
if,3
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… (1)
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In the above expression, y* is the unobserved true underlying severity of the 
constraint, X is a matrix of explanatory variables, y is the observed constraint 
ranking, and the δs are the unknown threshold values that cause firms to decide their 
answer for y.  We consider these constraints as a linear function of firm 
characteristics X, which include size, location, export status, type of production, firm 
age, type of firm ownership. The ordered probit approach uses maximum likelihood 
to determine the role of the explanatory variables.  The value of using this approach 
is that it allows us to examine whether a particular firm characteristic results in 
different answers about the severity of a constraint, after controlling for the effects of 
other explanatory variables.   
 
5.  ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON BUSINESS 
The framework used in this paper explains the business constraints for firms in 
Pakistan along six specific firm characteristics, in order to provide the basis for a 
deeper policy discussion.  We identify those characteristics of firms that produce 
statistically significant differences in their answers about the severity of business 
constraints.   The main emphasis will be on binding constraints, though the 
discussion also includes limited analysis of other constraints.  Table 4 provides the 
results of the ordered probit regressions.  Tables 5 through 10 follow by showing the 
percentage of firms identifying a constraint as “Major” or “Very Severe,” 
disaggregated by a particular firm characteristic.  These tables incorporate 
information from the ordered probit regression to identify which constraints produce 
statistically significant differences in the responses of firms disaggregated by the 
particular category.  These tables also identify the binding constraints as they apply 
to each of the firm characteristics. 
 
5.1.  Firm Size 
The relationship between firm size and business constraints has been studied in the 
literature.  Bari, et al. (2002) indicates that SMEs have generally faced greater challenges 
than their larger counterparts in Pakistan’s recent history, on account of the heavily 
regulated industrialisation policy.  Large firms held advantages because they were in 
better positions to obtain limited government licenses and investment incentives.  Large 
firms also had greater access to finance, because credit and interest rate controls left 
banks with little reason to loan to the riskier small firms.  Fixed costs in dealing with 
government regulators and administrators also worked to put a greater burden on smaller 
firms. 
After controlling for other firm characteristics, we find evidence that firm size 
matters at the 5 percent level of significance for the degree of constraint facing firms with 
regard to the binding constraints of tax issues, electricity, and access to financing (see 
Table 5).   
For nonbinding constraints, firm size matters for crime issues, access to land, 
labour regulations, and telecommunications.  Interestingly, some issues do not produce 
answers that differ in a statistically significant way by firm size, including financing 
costs, economic policy uncertainty, corruption, macroeconomic stability, customs and 
trade regulations, anticompetitive practices, business licensing and operating permits,  
Table 4 
Ordered—Probit of Constraints on Firm Characteristics 
 Binding Constraints Non-binding Constraints 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax Rates Cost of 
Financing 
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty 
Corruption Electricity Access to 
Financing (e.g. 
Collateral) 
Macro-
economic 
Instability 
Customs and 
Trade 
Regulations 
Anti-
competitive 
Practices 
Crime, Theft 
and Disorder 
Access to 
Land 
Labour 
Regulation 
Business 
Licensing and 
Operating Permits 
Skills and 
Education of 
Available 
Workers 
Transpor-
tation 
Telecommuni-
cations 
Firm Size (Omitted Condition is "Large Firm") 
  Overall p-value 0.0262* 0.0000** 0.7003 0.0596 0.5249 0.0159* 0.0265* 0.2651 0.0641 0.1105 0.0013** 0.0076** 0.0044** 0.4576 0.4582 0.5511 0.0281* 
   Micro Firm –0.3593* –0.6885** –0.0073 –0.1671 –0.1801 –0.2606 0.1001 –0.1641 –0.5220** –0.0099 –0.4576** 0.4649** –0.5386** 0.0406 –0.1813 –0.0662 –0.4794** 
   Small Firm –0.0505 –0.2306 0.1007 –0.2241 –0.0724 –0.0963 0.3091* –0.1336 –0.3207** –0.1132 –0.4399** 0.4326** –0.2289 0.1661 –0.0821 0.0009 –0.2889* 
   Medium Firm 0.0779 0.1293 0.0699 –0.3693** 0.0324 0.1854 0.2472 –0.2722* –0.0934 –0.2969* –0.5084** 0.3659* –0.0411 0.0826 0.0497 –0.1498 –0.1464 
Province (Omitted Condtion is "Sindh") 
  Overall p-value 0.2201 0.0614 0.0488* 0.3255 0.5349 0.0009** 0.0000** 0.7189 0.0046** 0.2524 0.0051** 0.0000** 0.0606 0.0044** 0.0031** 0.0847 0.4223 
   NWFP 0.0487 –0.0337 –0.4426** 0.2507 –0.0295 0.1262 –0.7807** –0.0359 0.1821 0.2933 –0.2071 –1.1439** –0.3575* –0.5160** –0.5957** –0.1399 –0.0882 
   Punjab 0.0225 –0.0557 –0.0772 0.0386 0.0145 –0.1789 –0.0516 –0.0846 –0.2300* 0.0398 –0.1398 –0.6174** –0.0069 –0.1662 –0.0291 –0.1249 –0.1184 
   Balochistan –0.2898 –0.4333** –0.0365 0.1974 –0.2112 –0.5373** –0.2206 –0.1544 –0.3041 –0.0287 0.3583* –0.3523* –0.2565 0.108 0.13 0.2355 –0.2591 
Exporter Status (Omitted Condition is "Non-exporter") 
  Overall p-value 0.0006** 0.0040** 0.0000** 0.8351 0.0070** 0.5582 0.0019** 0.2594 0.5369 0.0148* 0.2475 0.5844 0.0045** 0.0310* 0.7697 0.0662 0.2324 
   Exporter –0.3774** –0.3153** –0.4774** –0.0224 –0.2945** –0.0611 –0.3331** –0.1205 –0.0688 –0.2694* –0.1299 0.06 –0.3178** –0.2491* 0.0316 –0.2050 –0.1349 
Type of Production (Omitted Condition is "Textiles") 
  Overall p-value 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0051** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.6997 0.0000** 0.0009** 0.0361* 0.0125* 0.0018** 
  Garments –0.1331 –0.1706 –0.0739 0.0382 –0.1629 –0.1132 –0.1243 –0.01 0.0468 0.0763 0.0153 –0.0566 –0.0847 –0.1695 0.0043 0.0196 –0.2289 
  Leather –1.4174** –1.2257** –0.8074** –0.9682** –0.8473** –0.3121 –0.4312* –0.554** –0.7407** –0.5382* –0.6656** –0.0068 –0.6226** –0.5173* 0.1709 –0.2764 –0.6800** 
  Food Proc. 0.2715* 0.1678 0.0597 0.037 0.2051 0.173 0.1119 –0.0571 0.0521 0.2609* 0.0785 –0.0058 0.0786 –0.1825 –0.3657** –0.1675 0.0613 
  Electronics –0.2885* –0.6186** –0.2631* –0.3459** –0.1074 –0.0337 –0.1637 –0.2516 –0.1942 0.0955 0.0897 0.1353 –0.3690** –0.1598 0.0497 0.0402 0.074 
  Chemicals –0.0743 –0.0585 –0.0352 –0.051 0.0175 –0.064 –0.0073 –0.0217 0.1197 0.1684 0.0409 0.0666 0.1763 0.0056 0.0483 –0.1549 0.0413 
  Sports Goods –2.0439** –1.4757** –1.4185** –1.3818** –1.7798** –0.6394** –1.1207** –1.108** –1.0756** –1.8205** –2.1028** –0.2388 –1.4861** –1.1451** –0.1175 –0.7372** –0.6702** 
Firm Age (Omitted Condition is "0–5 Yr.") 
  Overall p-value 0.0041** 0.4788 0.4549 0.2875 0.7489 0.0588 0.4084 0.0030** 0.1080 0.1390 0.2605 0.0751 0.0636 0.2922 0.0821 0.821 0.3997 
  6–10 Yr. 0.3014* 0.072 0.1276 0.2281 0.1174 0.1018 –0.0057 0.4813** 0.1571 0.144 0.219 –0.2240 0.0517 0.2393 0.0092 –0.1018 0.1919 
  11–15 Yr. 0.4611** 0.1849 0.2158 0.1375 0.1059 0.0189 0.148 0.3036* 0.3302* 0.2778* 0.0548 0.0205 0.2695 0.2414 0.1 –0.132 0.1445 
  Over 15 Yr. 0.4372** 0.1489 0.1678 0.2209 0.142 0.2444 0.0961 0.3908** 0.2053 0.2600 0.1008 –0.0411 0.0453 0.1495 –0.1449 –0.1014 0.2322 
Firm Ownership (Omitted Condition is "Sole Proprietorship") 
  Overall p-value 0.0012** 0.0238* 0.0000** 0.0266* 0.0007** 0.7831 0.0000** 0.0063** 0.0003** 0.0001** 0.0107* 0.0357* 0.0056** 0.0241* 0.0419* 0.0642 0.1099 
   Publicly Listed Co. –0.017 –0.2847 0.3654* –0.179 –0.0394 –0.1085 0.139 0.1768 0.1918 0.0574 –0.0071 0.177 0.302 0.5261* 0.4970* 0.5923** 0.3392 
   Private limited Co. 0.2956** 0.2125* 0.4876** 0.1221 0.1912* 0.0452 0.4302** 0.2292* 0.3579** 0.3391** 0.2018* 0.2521* 0.3472** 0.3102** 0.2655** 0.2479* 0.0914 
   Partnership –0.0556 0.0261 0.2521* –0.118 –0.2479* 0.0635 0.1727 –0.0694 –0.0316 –0.1128 –0.1589 0.0062 0.2180 0.155 0.2579* 0.1486 0.2769* 
   Other –0.1323 –0.4054 –0.3793 0.6446 0.0254 –0.188 –0.1401 0.5688* 0.1121 0.4750 0.1043 0.2772 0.0951 0.4002 0.3401 0.468 0.2885 
Observations  953 954 953 954 953 954 953 953 948 954 953 953 954 952 953 953 952 
Note: * Significant at 5 percent; ** Significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 5 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as  
“Major” or “Very Severe” by Firm Size 
  Micro Small Medium Large 
Tax Administration 34.9% 47.7% 53.2% 49.6% 
Tax Rates 29.4% 45.9% 59.6% 54.3% 
  Financing Costs (Int. Rates) 33.3% 45.5% 41.8% 44.2% 
  Economic Policy Uncertainty 41.3% 39.2% 38.3% 46.5% 
  Corruption 33.3% 39.4% 45.4% 45.0% 
Electricity 33.3% 38.9% 48.2% 38.0% 
  Access to Financing (Collateral) 33.3% 40.7% 39.0% 31.8% 
  Macro-economic Instability 27.8% 33.3% 34.0% 45.7% 
  Customs and Trade Regulations 13.5% 22.4% 30.5% 36.4% 
  Anti-competitive Practices 26.2% 21.5% 12.1% 26.4% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder 17.5% 19.7% 19.9% 33.3% 
Access to Land 16.7% 22.0% 23.4% 18.6% 
Labour Regulations 7.9% 14.3% 22.7% 22.5% 
  Business Permits 11.1% 15.4% 16.3% 13.2% 
  Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers 9.5% 12.2% 20.6% 11.6% 
  Transportation 10.3% 10.6% 7.1% 10.9% 
Telecommunications 6.3% 6.8% 6.4% 14.0% 
Note:  Own calculations from Pakistan ICA.  The constraint name is in boldface if the ordered probit analysis 
identifies statistically significant differences at the 5 percent level in the answers of firms varying by the 
firm characteristic.  The percentage is in boldface if the constraint is binding for the sub-category, where 
binding constraints are identified as those with a median response indicating the constraint is at least 
“Moderate”, and at least 30 percent of firms identify the constraint as “Major” or “Very Severe”. 
 
skills and education of the labour force, and transportation.  But regarding tax issues and 
electricity, medium firms express the strongest complaints, followed by large firms, small 
firms, and micro firms, once we control for other factors.  In fact, micro firms generally 
have fewer complaints, as their only binding constraints are financing costs and economic 
policy uncertainty.  Meanwhile, for access to finance, small firms complain most, 
followed by medium, micro, and large firms.  
First consider the issues of tax administration and tax rates.  Micro firms complain 
about these issues much less than their larger counterparts.  In fact, tax issues are not a 
binding constraint for micro firms.  Regarding tax administration, the responses of small 
and medium firms are not statistically distinguishable from the responses of large firms.  
With regard to tax rates, we find evidence that micro and small firms do complain to a 
lesser degree in a statistically significant way, than do medium or large firms.  We can 
observe some justification for this through further exploration of the data along three 
parameters: the amount of entrepreneurial time spent in dealing with tax regulators, 
average fines paid during a year, and average bribes paid to the regulators.  We find 
evidence in the ICA that larger firms must devote significantly more resources in 
absolute terms for dealing with taxation issues, while small firms are most burdened as a 
percentage of sales.  Micro firms can more easily escape the targets of the government 
tax authorities.     
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Access to financing is an important issue, as it is seventh in the list of binding 
constraints, and here it is the case that large firms complain least and small firms 
complain most.  Access to financing is only a binding constraint for small and medium 
firms.  In a topic deserving much greater attention, we indeed find evidence that firm size 
has a direct bearing on a firm’s ability to get financing from formal channels; larger firms 
enjoy easier and greater access to formal financing than their smaller counterparts in the 
ICA.  It is puzzling why micro firms do not voice loud complaints despite having the 
least access to formal financing though.  For example, more than half of large firms had 
at least one loan from a bank at the time of the survey, while this is true for only 2.3 
percent of micro firms.  There are several possible explanations.  Micro firms believe that 
they will not be entertained by the financial institutions, and hence they are discouraged 
to apply in the first place and then effectively find other sources of financing. Also, micro 
firms assign low probability to their survival in a highly uncertain economic policy 
environment and avoid taking any additional liabilities in the absence of effective 
bankruptcy procedures. 
There are four other constraints with statistically significant differing answers 
regarding firm size that are not binding in nature.  These are related to crime, access to 
land, labour regulations, and telecommunications. The most likely targets of theft and 
crimes are the large enterprises. Limited financial resources have translated into the 
larger complaints by the micro, small and medium enterprises about the access to land. 
Unlike the usual perception that labour regulations are a real source of trouble for the 
smaller firms, see SMEDA (2002) and SMEDA (2004), our analysis suggests otherwise, 
as the bigger a firm is, the more it tends to complain about labour regulations. 
Revisiting the discussion above, our analysis suggests that conditions for the SME 
manufacturing sector in Pakistan can improve if reform efforts focus on: (a) improving 
both tax rates and tax administration to respond better to SMEs’ unique conditions, b) 
ensuring the supply of electricity from the national grid, and c) deepening the formal 
financing to reach out to smaller firms. To make the business environment even more 
conducive for micro and small manufacturers, giving access to land should be considered. 
However, any intervention in other areas is likely benefit larger enterprises more than the 
SMEs. 
 
5.2.  Firm Location 
Table 6 provides evidence that, after controlling for other firm characteristics, the 
province in which a firm is located affects its business constraints.  Firms in Sindh and 
NWFP tend to voice louder complaints than those in Punjab and Balochistan.  The subset 
of binding constraints in which firm location plays an important role in producing 
different responses, with at least 5 percent significance, include the cost of financing, 
electricity, and access to financing.  With regard to the costs of financing and access to 
financing, the complaints are loudest in Sindh, though the responses in Punjab, 
Balochistan, and Sindh do not differ significantly from one another.  However, financing 
issues are an area in which complaints from NWFP are significantly lower, once we 
control for other firm characteristics.  As for electricity, the degree of complaints is 
significantly less in Balochistan than the other regions.  NWFP experiences the biggest 
problems with electricity, followed by Sindh and Punjab.  We find justification for this in  
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Table 6 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as  
“Major” or “Very Severe” by Region 
  Sindh NWFP Punjab Balochistan 
Tax Administration 54.4% 56.6% 43.6% 39.3% 
Tax Rates 54.8% 59.2% 42.7% 39.3% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates) 50.6% 40.8% 40.3% 44.3% 
  Economic Policy Uncertainty 39.7% 56.6% 38.4% 41.0% 
  Corruption 41.4% 47.4% 39.4% 34.4% 
Electricity 43.5% 52.6% 38.8% 13.1% 
Access to Financing (Collateral) 46.4% 23.7% 36.9% 37.7% 
  Macro-economic Instability 39.3% 40.8% 31.5% 34.4% 
Customs and Trade Regulations 28.5% 39.5% 20.9% 21.3% 
  Anti-competitive Practices 13.4% 39.5% 23.0% 14.8% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder 23.8% 15.8% 18.7% 42.6% 
Access to Land 38.1% 3.9% 16.3% 21.3% 
  Labour Regulations 16.7% 10.5% 16.6% 11.5% 
Business Permits 19.7% 5.3% 13.0% 23.0% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers 12.1% 9.2% 12.6% 24.6% 
  Transportation 10.0% 11.8% 9.0% 18.0% 
  Telecommunications 7.5% 6.6% 7.6% 9.8% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.  
  
the survey, as the median percentage of merchandise value lost due to electricity 
problems follows the same ordering.  In NWFP, the median firm estimates that it loses 5 
percent of its merchandise on account of electricity problems.  Because different regions 
have different experiences with electricity, there are grounds for a deeper analysis of the 
arrangement of electricity production and supply in the four regions. 
The regional location of firms also produces statistical significance for some non-
binding constraints as well.  For instance, customs and trade regulations are less of a 
problem in Balochistan and Punjab than in NWFP and Sindh.  Meanwhile, access to land 
is a bigger problem in Sindh than in other regions.  This constraint points to possible 
opportunities for substantially improving the investment climate by establishing new 
industrial zones in Sindh.  Complaints about access to land are particularly low in NWFP 
once we control for other factors.  As for the issues of crime, business permits, and 
worker skills, Balochistan experiences the biggest problems, followed by Sindh, Punjab, 
and NWFP.    
 
5.3.  Access to Export Markets 
Exporting firms overwhelmingly have fewer complaints than firms serving only 
the domestic market, as shown in Table 7.  At the 5 percent level of significance, our 
analysis regarding market access has confirmed significantly lower complaints for 
exporters with five of the eight binding constraints.  For the other constraints, exporters 
complain  less, but  not significantly less.  In general, exporters complain less with regard  
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Table 7 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as “Major”  
or “Very Severe”, by Market Access 
  Non-exporters Exporters 
Tax Administration 51.2% 29.2% 
Tax Rates 50.6% 30.3% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates) 47.2% 25.8% 
  Economic Policy Uncertainty 43.2% 28.1% 
Corruption 43.3% 27.0% 
  Electricity 41.4% 30.9% 
Access to Financing (Collateral) 42.1% 21.3% 
  Macro-economic Instability 37.0% 23.0% 
  Customs and Trade Regulations 25.5% 19.1% 
Anti-competitive Practices 23.1% 14.0% 
  Crime, Theft and Disorder 22.7% 15.2% 
  Access to Land 22.0% 16.9% 
Labour Regulations 17.0% 10.7% 
Business Permits 16.1% 8.4% 
  Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers 13.5% 10.7% 
  Transportation 11.0% 6.2% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.  
  
to tax issues, financing issues, and experiences with corruption.  In fact, the only 
constraint identified as binding by exporting firms in the survey is electricity.  As for 
non-binding constraints, exporters complain significantly less about anti-competitive 
practices, labour regulations, and business permits.    
For practical reasons, exporting firms can complain less because they enjoy special 
incentive packages in areas such as taxation, financing, and other regulations.4  Briefly, 
exporting firms are not required to pay sales tax (VAT), and income tax is governed by a 
presumptive tax regime, which allows exporters to settle their income tax liability by 
paying tax at a rate ranging between 0.75 percent and 1.25 percent of sales. This 
arrangement takes away both of the top ranking constraints for exporters, and it allows 
them to internalise the costs of taxation as a fixed operating cost. 
The arrangement for financing is also unique for exporters. The central bank of 
Pakistan allows exporters to have access to an export refinancing fund, available through all 
commercial banking channels without a requirement of furnishing any physical collateral. 
Additionally, the export refinancing rates are pegged to the average six-month Treasury bill 
rates plus a certain percentage for covering operational costs. This arrangement has allowed 
exporters to enjoy increased access to financing at the lowest possible market interest rates.  
There are some limitations, however, because commercial banks can occasionally demand 
additional collateral for riskier clients. Corruption and uncertainty about regulations and 
policy is also reduced because of lessened contact between exporters and regulators.  In 
general, our analysis confirms the effectiveness of said incentives resulting in relatively 
better scores from exporters against those constraints.  
 
4For details on incentives, please visit <www.tdap.gov.pk>.   
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5.4.  Manufacturing Sub-sector 
Does the type of product a firm produces matter for its well-being in the Pakistani 
business environment?  Are some industries able to offer better investment opportunities than 
others? The answer to these questions is yes, as shown in Table 8. After controlling for other 
factors, the sub-manufacturing industry of the firm is an important determinant of its 
constraints.  In fact, overall responses are different at the sub-manufacturing level for all of the 
constraints except for access to land.  Among textiles, garments, leather goods, food 
processing, electronics, chemicals, and sports goods, business conditions in Pakistan tend to 
most favour the sports goods industry, followed by leather manufacturers and electronics 
manufacturers.  To be precise, the sports goods and leather goods industries do not experience 
any binding constraints.  Meanwhile, the food processing industry complains most loudly, 
though the responses from textiles, garments, and chemicals are also relatively close.    
Given these results, the industrial sectors can be classified in two groups based on their 
relative perceptions about the business environment. The first group comprises sports goods, 
leather goods, and electronics.  While sports goods and leather goods are well ahead, the case 
of electronics is more split, since they are better off than the textiles, garments, chemicals and 
food processing industries, but only for the first four binding constraints, from tax 
administration to economic policy uncertainty. For the rest of the binding constraints, from 
corruption to macroeconomic instability, their experience is no different.  
The second group includes textiles, garments, chemicals, and food processing.  It 
is interesting that textile and garment manufacturers voice loud complaints.  SMEDA 
(2005) and the World Bank (2004a) predict declining returns for the textile and garment 
industries in Pakistan, with regard to the abolition of textile quotas and increased 
competition from other regional players, such as India, Bangladesh, and China.  Food 
processing firms voice the loudest complaints, though tax administration is the only area 
which has any statistical significance for this sector, besides anticompetitive practices in 
the list of nonbinding constraints. On the other hand, in terms of the availability of skilled 
labour, food processing is the only industry which enjoys better conditions. 
The survey results identify issues which have direct bearing on the industrial 
policy of Pakistan. The results imply potential opportunities for improving investment 
conditions substantially for the textiles, garments, chemicals and food processing 
industries by placing them at the core of possible future industrial policy. Given the fresh 
investment by the textile and the garment sectors to the tune of USD 4 billion, it is all the 
more important to understand reasons for the differences at the sub-manufacturing level 
for evolving a more conducive business environment. 
 
5.5.  Firm Age 
It is interesting that firm age is not an important factor for determining how firms 
view potential business constraints, once we control for other factors (see Table 9).  The 
only two constraints with differential responses are tax administration and 
macroeconomic instability.  With regard to tax administration, the largest constraints are 
felt by firms between 11 and 15 years old, while the young firms are least affected again.  
As for macroeconomic stability, the youngest firms are least affected; macroeconomic 
stability is not a binding constraint for firms between 0 and 5 years old.  The biggest 
complaints come from firms between 6 and 10 years old.   
Table 8 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as “Major” or “Very Severe”, by Industry 
  
Textiles Garments Leather 
Food 
Processing Electronics Chemicals 
Sports 
Goods 
Tax Administration 51.2% 49.3% 7.5% 62.9% 38.6% 50.0% 2.2% 
Tax Rates 53.5% 50.7% 7.5% 62.3% 25.7% 51.4% 2.2% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates) 47.7% 41.9% 10.0% 54.3% 37.6% 48.6% 2.2% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty 43.9% 41.9% 15.0% 51.7% 32.7% 42.8% 4.3% 
Corruption 43.3% 35.3% 10.0% 52.3% 39.6% 46.4% 2.2% 
Electricity 42.4% 33.8% 17.5% 53.6% 37.6% 37.7% 15.2% 
Access to Financing (Collateral) 42.7% 33.8% 17.5% 47.0% 36.6% 40.6% 4.3% 
Macro-economic Instability 38.9% 38.2% 10.0% 39.7% 26.7% 37.7% 0.0% 
Customs and Trade Regulations 22.8% 30.9% 7.5% 30.5% 19.8% 30.4% 2.2% 
Anti-competitive Practices 16.4% 18.4% 12.5% 31.1% 30.7% 28.3% 2.2% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder 20.5% 18.4% 7.5% 25.2% 24.8% 30.4% 0.0% 
  Access to Land 26.3% 20.6% 0.0% 21.9% 19.8% 18.1% 10.9% 
Labour Regulations 14.9% 16.2% 5.0% 21.2% 8.9% 25.4% 0.0% 
Business Permits 17.0% 14.0% 7.5% 15.9% 11.9% 16.7% 2.2% 
Skills and Education of Avail. Workers 15.2% 14.0% 12.5% 7.3% 12.9% 15.9% 4.3% 
Transportation 10.8% 10.3% 5.0% 11.9% 8.9% 11.6% 0.0% 
Telecommunications 7.3% 5.1% 2.5% 8.6% 11.9% 10.9% 0.0% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.  
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Table 9 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as “Major”  
or “Very Severe”, by Firm Age 
  0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years Over 15 Years 
Tax Administration 42.7% 48.4% 50.9% 44.7% 
Tax Rates 43.8% 49.1% 46.0% 46.4% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates) 37.5% 46.3% 45.1% 40.9% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty 39.6% 42.5% 39.4% 39.5% 
Corruption 36.5% 40.0% 41.2% 40.9% 
Electricity 38.5% 36.5% 36.3% 44.1% 
Access to Financing (Collateral) 33.3% 38.6% 40.7% 37.8% 
Macro-economic Instability 26.0% 38.9% 34.1% 33.1% 
Customs and Trade Regulations 18.8% 22.8% 27.4% 25.1% 
Anti-competitive Practices 17.7% 18.2% 25.7% 22.2% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder 15.6% 23.9% 22.6% 19.9% 
Access to Land 19.8% 15.8% 23.5% 24.2% 
Labour Regulations 12.5% 14.0% 18.6% 16.4% 
Business permits 10.4% 15.8% 15.0% 14.7% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers 13.5% 14.0% 17.3% 9.2% 
Transportation 14.6% 8.8% 9.3% 10.4% 
Telecommunications 8.3% 8.1% 7.1% 7.5% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.  
 
As for why young firms complain the least, the answer may be related to survey 
bias in the ICA sample.  As an illustration of this bias, a sample of 279 manufacturing 
firms from Directories of Labour Year Book 2000, Karachi—Government of Sindh, were 
contacted one year after publication, and it was discovered that some 85 businesses were 
either closed or not traceable. This suggests a degree of severity in business conditions 
for new entrants that cannot be picked up entirely in the sample due to the lag between 
obtaining sources for choosing the sample and actually interviewing the selected firms.   
 
5.6.  Ownership Structure 
Previous analysis, such as SMEDA (2002), indicates that ownership structure does 
matter for the development and the growth of a firm. Ideally, more formalised structures 
should lead to better business services delivery from the business support institutions and 
should result in better business conditions for firms.  This is not the only possibility, 
however, as Osama (2004) suggests that corporatisation provides no additional 
advantages for taxes, access to business support services, or financing.  Instead, a limited 
liability structure is more expensive on account of tax rates and fixed operational costs 
associated with additional paper work.  
The survey shows that firm ownership structure is very important in determining 
the degree of constraint reported by businesses.  Table 10 shows that ownership is 
statistically significant for all binding constraints except for electricity.  Private limited 
companies report the largest complaints for all of the statistically significant binding 
constraints.  Private limited companies and sole proprietors are only comparable for 
economic policy uncertainty and electricity.  On the other hand, publicly listed companies 
have lesser complaints than the sole proprietary concerns for most of the binding 
constraints.  In  cases  where  publicly  listed  companies claim a higher degree of binding  
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Table 10 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as “Major”  
or “Very Severe”, by Firm Ownership 
  
Publicly held 
Limited 
Liability 
Privately held 
Limited 
Liability Partnership Sole Proprietorship 
Tax Administration 40.6% 57.6% 29.9% 39.1% 
Tax Rates 40.6% 57.4% 33.5% 36.4% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates) 34.4% 52.9% 34.1% 33.2% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty 34.4% 44.2% 26.9% 41.1% 
Corruption 34.4% 48.4% 24.0% 36.8% 
  Electricity 40.6% 42.4% 38.9% 34.0% 
Access to Financing (Collateral) 21.9% 45.9% 31.7% 30.8% 
Macro-economic Instability 40.6% 40.1% 25.1% 27.7% 
Customs and Trade Regulations 28.1% 31.9% 15.0% 15.0% 
Anti-competitive Practices 21.9% 25.3% 10.2% 20.6% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder 21.9% 27.2% 14.4% 14.6% 
  Access to Land 18.8% 25.7% 13.8% 17.0% 
Labour Regulations 21.9% 18.3% 15.0% 11.1% 
Business Permits 12.5% 16.3% 12.0% 13.4% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers 12.5% 15.0% 11.4% 9.9% 
Transportation 15.6% 12.3% 5.4% 7.5% 
  Telecommunications 15.6% 8.8% 6.0% 5.5% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.  
  
constraint, which include cost of financing, access to finance, and macroeconomic 
instability, the results are not statistically significant.  Firm ownership continues to play a 
statistically significant role in explaining the responses to seven of the nine nonbinding 
constraints.  Again, in these cases, the complaints of private limited companies are the 
largest by a statistically significant degree.  The complaints of sole proprietorships, 
publicly listed companies, and partnerships follow, but are generally not distinguishable 
from one another, except for the case of workforce skills, where sole proprietorships 
complain significantly less. 
The survey data confirms the fact that privately held companies spend more days 
dealing with regulators and pay more to government regulators in terms of fines and 
bribes.  Being a corporate entity in Pakistan does not offer any incentives in terms of 
dealing with tax authorities, qualifying for better tax rates, negotiating lower interest rates 
or better access to finance, dealing with corruption, or fighting macroeconomic 
instability.  Sole proprietary concerns can more easily escape from regulatory oversight 
without losing any advantages in terms of access to business services or resources.  This 
has important implications for developing the formal economy of Pakistan, and not 
letting firms slip into the informal economy.  The State Bank of Pakistan (2001) 
estimates that the informal economy was close to 32 percent of the total between 1996 
and 2000.  The magnitude of the informal economy makes it difficult for the government 
to adequately plan and provide effective business services. As we understand, it has its 
roots in ownership structure of the firms and any effort to improve conditions for 
privately held firms will help to improve the investment climate. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study confirms that a one-size-fits-all policy is not appropriate for improving 
the conditions of Pakistan’s manufacturing firms.  A number of different firm 
characteristics are found to play important roles in determining business constraints.  
First, while existing research, such as SMEDA (2002) and SMEDA (2004), discusses 
firm growth vis-à-vis firm size, it does not recognise a need for different mechanical 
processes based on firm size.  The analysis of responses in this research sketches a 
different picture. While confirming heterogeneity with regard to the aforementioned 
constraints, the results suggest that smaller firms are better off in quantitative terms. The 
efforts of the smaller firms and micro firms in particular are devoted in escaping 
regulatory burden, using bribes and gifts to regulators as a tool. Large firms tend to use 
similar tools for reducing their official tax liabilities and remain within the regulatory 
environment. This difference in approach to dealing with regulatory burden requires a 
different policy treatment for ironing out the variations of firm size in the regulatory 
environment. This would also require the development of different mechanical processes 
based on firm size. Access to finance comes out as the top-ranking constraint for the 
small firms, where the difference is both wide and significant. Using Non-bank Financial 
Institutions (NBFI) as a channel for small firms would greatly improve their condition 
(please see Table 11 for a summary of policy recommendations).  
Additionally, certain regional locations in Pakistan are posing an extra burden on 
firms due to the lack of necessary infrastructure such as electricity and industrial land, 
which becomes binding constraints to their growth. Most of the significantly differing 
responses, though, come from the list of non-binding constraints. An appropriate 
response to remove these barriers would include that the government yield modest 
resources in terms of setting up new industrial parks with adequate infrastructural 
support.  
Meanwhile, exporting firms face only a few binding constraints. The difference in 
the condition of non-exporters and exporters are stark and significant, and incentives for 
exporters with respect to most of the regulations are creating another divide among 
industrial enterprises. While the incentive regime for exporters is effective and results in 
fewer complaints, it needs to be counterbalanced with a business support mechanism for 
non-exporters to smooth differences.  
Furthermore, there are definitely some industries which enjoy relatively better 
regulatory environments than others. Sports and leather goods industries complain least. 
The specific conditions surrounding these industries could give clues for making life 
better for others. The results in this respect also pose doubts about the effectiveness of 
industrial policies for creating better conditions. It appears that they are distorting the 
business environment whereby some industries like food processing are becoming worse 
off without bettering conditions for others.  Current industrial policy should be 
pragmatically reviewed.  
Among the surviving enterprises, older firms do not enjoy any extra advantage, 
despite prevailing popular beliefs.  On the contrary, older firms are penalised in terms of 
tax administration. This suggests that tax regulators go after obvious targets regardless of 
their compliance record. This underlying psychology of the regulator explains firms’ 
general preference for tax evasion.  
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Table 11 
Policy Analysis of Firm Conditions vis-à-vis Constraints 
Policy Area Analysis/ Challenges/ Policy Focal Points 
Firm Size Reducing interface between tax regulators and firms will reduce compliance costs for 
all but micro sized firms  
Only a responsive tax regime for smaller size firms (micro and small) can improve 
business conditions—analysis confirmed that smaller firms end up paying more (as a 
percentage of sales) to avoid interface with tax authorities 
Access to finance is a binding constraint for small size firms—survey results show that 
Non-bank Financial Institutions are more effective than the commercial banks 
Increasing access to land can significantly improve the business climate for SMEs 
Labour regulations are not a constraint for SMEs, reducing interface of labour 
regulators is desired more by large firms 
Regional Location Firms in Sindh and NWFP tend to voice the loudest complaints 
Cost of financing, electricity, and access to financing and industrial land are the key 
areas for improvement in Sindh 
In NWFP major complaints are about economic policy uncertainty, electricity supply 
and taxation 
The major concern in Balochistan is the prevailing law and order situation 
Market Access  
(Local and Foreign) 
Non-exporters generally feel deprived 
The incentive regime for exporters is effective resulting in fewer complaints 
The difference in the conditions of non-exporting and exporting firms are stark 
In order to avoid another divide in the economy, the incentive structure must be 
counterbalanced through other business support mechanisms for non-exporting firms 
Sub-manufacturing 
Sector 
The business or investment conditions across industries are significantly different 
Sports goods, leather goods and electronics industries enjoy relatively better 
investment conditions.  Indeed, the first two do not experience binding constraints 
Returns are declining in textiles, garments and chemical industries—due to fierce 
foreign competition 
The food processing industry produces the most complaints, particularly about tax 
administration and anti-competitive practices 
Industrial and investment policies must carefully look into the incentives for different 
industries 
Firm Age Analysis does not confirm any particular advantage related to the age of the firm, 
except that old firms are more exposed to taxation-related problems 
It is reasonable to conclude that the existing business climate does not encourage new 
start-ups. 
 
Ownership Structure Privately held limited liability companies face large compliance costs 
There is no added advantage to be a corporate entity in terms of taxation, finance, or in 
accessing business services or resources 
Sole proprietary firms do not show any disadvantage or advantage over publicly held 
companies or partnerships but are definitely better off than privately held limited 
liability companies 
Cross Cutting 
Themes 
There are constraints that are significant for many types of firms, such as electricity 
supply from public grid, macroeconomic stability, and law and order  
A more reliable power supply from public grid has the largest potential to improve 
growth conditions across the board 
Stabilising the shifting policy regime would further strengthen the confidence of 
investors 
An improved law and order situation would greatly enhance firms’ ability to grow and 
plan for long-term investments 
  
Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development 21 
Finally, we establish that more formal structures of organising businesses, such as 
privately held limited liability companies, can also be punishing to firms. The current 
regulatory environment in Pakistan is killing the incentives for formal business structure 
and becoming a liability for business. 
Conclusively, evidence is found that economic policy reforms in Pakistan 
cannot treat firms as homogeneous units.  A great amount of heterogeneity exists, 
and this heterogeneity can drive many different responses to questions about the 
severity of business constraints. For instance, fashioning an effective business 
climate for micro firms will entail different policies than for small, medium, or large 
firms.  Additionally, we find that access to foreign markets, type of production, and 
type of firm ownership play substantial roles in determining business responses to 
constraints.  The age of the firm is less important, as is the province in which the 
firm is located.  Some issues are cross-cutting across firms, such as a desire for a 
more reliable electricity supply, but generally the results suggest that policy-makers 
must develop proposals that account for the heterogeneity of firms, and that a one-
size-fits-all approach will not be effective and could even have unintended 
consequences. 
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